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The Problem of Media-driven Policy-making
Th roughout American history, public opinion and 
the actions of our lawmakers have been swayed by 
tragic or sensational stories. At times, these actions 
have been well reasoned and proportional to the need 
for public safety and social control such as the work-
place safety legislation passed in the wake of the 1911 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory ﬁ re in New York City in 
which 146 trapped garment workers perished. While 
legislative changes based on large scale tragedies are 
often warranted, politicians have also been known to 
capitalize on singular events to advance their agen-
das or demonize their opponents. Th is strategy was 
a key component of George H. W. Bush’s successful 
presidential campaign of 1988 when he relentlessly 
criticized Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis 
for condoning a program that allowed the weekend 
furlough of Willie Horton—a lone case of a convicted 
murderer who escaped from the furlough program 
and later assaulted and raped a woman in Maryland.2 
Th ese sensationalized cases, due to the impact of 
24-hour cable TV news coverage, increasingly create 
the context for public policy discussion. Stories about 
violent crime are a common feature of the local eve-
ning news, and their emotional nature can often create 
the hook politicians need to showcase their “tough 
on crime” agendas. Often anecdotal and lurid, stories 
of criminal misdeeds are widely used to convince the 
public of a need to create or change laws. 
A Sea Change in Juvenile Justice Policy
A case in point is the public discussion of juvenile 
justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Articles from 
that time concerning juvenile justice policy almost 
always begin with a shocking story of a crime commit-
ted by a juvenile. Other stories published in the early 
1990s warned of the rise of violent, depraved “super-
predator” youths and sparked a nationwide wave of 
increasingly punitive laws aimed at juvenile crime.3 
Th ere has been scant media coverage, however, of the 
many juveniles who got caught in the wider net cast by 
this new legislation. Th ere is little public discussion or 
thoughtful analysis in the mainstream media of the ef-
ﬁ cacy of these new “tough on crime” policies. Although 
their cases were minor and would have been settled 
quickly and conﬁ dentially in juvenile court, many 
juvenile oﬀ enders found themselves in the adult system. 
Th ere they entered a kind of no-man’s land where they 
were considered too old to be treated as children but 
were completely unprepared to fend for themselves in 
the adult penal system and ineligible for adult social 
programs, like housing assistance, upon release. 
In this article, I examine the impact of a 1995 
change in New Hampshire state law that lowered the 
age that a youth could be charged as an adult from 18 
to 17. Th e law was passed in the wake of two isolated 
but brutal juvenile murders with little examination of 
the empirical data. Th is article, therefore, points out 
the perils of making law by extrapolating from a few 
random, albeit attention-grabbing, events.
A Miscarriage of Juvenile Justice:
A Modern-day Parable of the 
Unintended Results of Bad Lawmaking1
by Amy Vorenberg, Franklin Pierce Law School
“A story is only half told if only one side has been presented.”
- Icelandic Proverb
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Although New Hampshire is the focal point of this 
article, other states’ stories are similar. Th e Michigan 
legislature responded to public attention on juvenile 
crime by amending its state juvenile code in 1996 
and in so doing instituted one of the more punitive 
approaches to juvenile law.4 Th ese changes were made 
despite the fact that violent crime, including juvenile 
violent crime, was on the decrease5
To demonstrate the counter-productive and per-
haps damaging nature of this approach to governance, 
I will review juvenile crime rate statistics for the 
period in question, but it is my view that the impact 
of the data alone can be signiﬁ cantly enhanced by ex-
amining speciﬁ c instances of the law’s eﬀ ect. If media 
stories are used to justify legislative actions, then the 
stories of those aﬀ ected by the actions should similarly 
be useful in deciding if the change was warranted. 
I will go beyond the data and recount the story of 
Justin B., a young man whose arrest for simple under-
age drinking began a Kafka-esque descent into legal 
limbo and incarceration. Th is article will show that 
in New Hampshire, as in states all over the country, 
the statutory change was an overreaction prompted by 
sensationalized and anecdotal evidence. By looking at 
the events and inﬂ uences that inspired New Hamp-
shire’s legislative changes, the consequences of the 
new law, and the eﬀ ects it had on Justin B.’s life, I will 
show that the law not only fell far short of its intended 
goals, but possibly made the citizens of New Hamp-
shire less safe and at great cost. 
As one of the oﬀ enders who entered the adult sys-
tem at 17, Justin B. got caught in the no-man’s land 
I have described and consequently was pulled more 
deeply into a life of petty crime and substance abuse. 
“I was 17 when I went to jail for the ﬁ rst time. Before 
I went to jail, I wasn’t a violent person; I didn’t ﬁ ght. But 
I had to ﬁ ght in jail. After I got out of jail, I’d ﬂ ip out 
on people who gave me attitude, where before I would’ve 
ignored them.”
The New Hampshire Approach—All Emotion, 
No Reason 
Before we look more closely at the street-level im-
pact of a delinquency age of 17, let’s review how this 
legislation came to be changed in New Hampshire. 
Criminal defendants are charged either as juveniles 
or adults.6 In most states youths are considered adults 
once they turn 18, but there are a number of states 
that set the cutoﬀ  at a younger age.7 Many states, 
including New Hampshire, have a legal process by 
which children under the delinquency age charged 
with certain enumerated violent crimes can be certi-
ﬁ ed as adults and charged as adults.8 Before 1995, 
children age 18 or under were prosecuted as juveniles 
in New Hampshire. 9 In 1995, the NH legislature 
passed a law that changed the deﬁ nition of a “minor” 
from a person under the age of 18 to a person under 
the age of 17.10 
What prompted this change? In late 1987, a 14-
year-old boy murdered a 9-year old boy in the small 
town of Pittsﬁ eld, New Hampshire by shooting him 
in the head. Th e two children knew each other, and 
the body was discovered when the 14-year old agreed 
to show the police where he left the body. Th e grue-
some crime was the subject of numerous stories in the 
media.  Despite the shocking nature of the crime, the 
New Hampshire Attorney General’s Oﬃ  ce could not 
prosecute the case because the boy was too young to 
be considered for certiﬁ cation as an adult under the 
statute at the time.11
Ultimately, the perpetrator was prosecuted in 
juvenile court and received the maximum sentence of 
roughly three years at a youth detention facility—the 
number of years remaining until he turned 18, when 
the juvenile system no longer had jurisdiction. Th ere 
was no option to transfer him to adult court.12 
New Hampshire has one of the lowest rates of ho-
micide in the country,13 but, coincidentally, later the 
same year a 15-year-old was involved in the murder of 
a 5-year-old.14 
In the aftermath of these two terrible incidents, the 
New Hampshire legislature took up the cause of juve-
nile law reform. Th e State’s attorney general, Stephen 
Merrill, had handled the prosecution of both murders. 
Frustrated that he was powerless to prosecute the teen 
defendants in adult court, Merrill championed a new 
law to lower to 13 the age at which juveniles accused 
of serious crimes could be certiﬁ ed by a court and 
treated as adults. Th e measure was adopted by the leg-
islature in 1988 but limited to cases of murder, rape, 
and kidnapping.15 At the time, there were rumors that 
Attorney General Merrill proposed the change and 
took a public position on the matter to further his 
own political aspirations.16 Merrill denied the rumors, 
but eight months later, Merrill said that he would “not 
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rule out” political oﬃ  ce.17 In 1992, Merrill ran for 
governor and won. When Merrill began his reelec-
tion campaign two years later (the term of oﬃ  ce in 
New Hampshire is two years), he made juvenile crime 
a focal point of his campaign.18 Following a “tough 
on crime” campaign strategy common in American 
politics, Merrill proposed a further change in the law, 
namely, to lower the age of delinquency for all crimes, 
not just violent crimes, from 18 to 17. 19
Merrill and his allies in the legislature cited two 
reasons to support this change. First, they claimed 
there had been an increase in violent juvenile crime in 
New Hampshire.20 Second, they asserted that police 
oﬃ  cers were witnessing a rise in the number of illegal 
drug sales in the populous southern part of the state 
adjacent to the neighboring state of Massachusetts. 
Th e age of delinquency was 18 in New Hampshire 
versus 17 in Massachusetts, and so police representa-
tives believed that juveniles were crossing the border 
speciﬁ cally to undertake illicit drug transactions be-
cause they were safe in the knowledge that, if caught, 
they would face lighter penalties in juvenile court.21 
The Myth of Rising Juvenile Crime
Although state and national statistics were read-
ily available, proponents of the delinquency changes 
made little reference to them during legislative hear-
ings on the new bill. Witnesses testiﬁ ed that there had 
been an increase in violent juvenile crime. 22 Had the 
legislature studied the available data, however, they 
would have found that juvenile violent crime in New 
Hampshire had leveled oﬀ  or even started to decline. 
(Figure 1). In fact, the total number of violent crimes 
committed by juveniles fell 26 percent in 1994, from 
a peak in 1993. Th e total number of violent crimes 
committed by 17-year-olds, those that the new law 
was trying to impact, did rise from 1992 to 1994 but 
returned in 1995 to the same level seen in 1990. Th e 
total number of violent crimes committed by 17-year- 
olds peaked at only 32, a small sample with which to 
make statistical assertions.
 In short, one cannot draw a ﬁ rm conclusion from 
the data concerning any trend toward higher crime 
rates; the variation in the numbers could just as easily 
be due to coincidence. Th e signiﬁ cant increase was 
among 15- and 16-year-olds, neither of which would 
have been aﬀ ected by the new law. 
 Support for the legislation rested largely on anec-
dotal information. Several chiefs of police and other 
law enforcement oﬃ  cers testiﬁ ed or wrote letters in 
support of lowering the age of delinquency.24 One po-
lice chief appearing on behalf of the New Hampshire 
Chiefs Association testiﬁ ed that “the increase in the 
incidence of violent crime committed by young adults 
in our society is a trend which is unacceptable. And 
demands new thinking.”25 
Th e governor stressed the need to distinguish be-
tween the juvenile who makes a “stupid mistake” and 
the young person who is “in fact a career criminal.”26 
Other witnesses who testiﬁ ed in support of the bill 
assured concerned legislators that the new law was 
meant for the serious oﬀ enders and that discretion on 
the part of judges and prosecutors would protect 17-
year-olds accused of minor oﬀ enses.27  
Th e new law was proposed speciﬁ cally to address the 
upsurge of violent crime by 17-year-olds by designating 
them as adults. However, there was no upsurge in this 
particular category. In fact, the overall rate of arrests of 
17-year-olds was trending down. (Figure 2). Th e data 
Figure 1: NH Arrests for Violent Crime by Juveniles23
Figure 2: Total Arrests of New Hampshire 17-Year-Olds29
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show that the number of arrests declined from 1988 
to 1992, and the increased numbers of 1993 and 1994 
did not reﬂ ect a signiﬁ cant upward trend. Indeed, 
total arrests during that period never approached 
those seen in 1988, long before the supposed spike in 
juvenile crime. 28
Perhaps even more signiﬁ cant, the rate of violent 
crime among 17-year-olds was decreasing. (Figure 3)
Th e national data also did not demonstrate a spike 
in violent youth crime. Although there was an in-
crease in the rate of arrests for youth violent crime, the 
increase occurred throughout all age brackets. Nota-
bly, the increase in arrests for violent crime occurred 
equally in the juvenile age bracket (13 to 17) and in 
the young adult bracket (18 to 24). 31 Between 1992 
and 2000, there was a signiﬁ cant decline in violent 
crime nationally, and this was largely due to a decrease 
in arrests of juveniles for violent crime.32 
Th e increase in juvenile violent crime in the late 
80s and early 90s mirrored a general increase in 
violent crime nationwide. 33 Th e overall violent crime 
rate continued on an uphill rise until 1993 and then 
gradually declined until it leveled oﬀ  in 2000.34
Th e notion that there was a spike in juvenile 
violent crime in the late 1980s may have been as 
much a response to fear, driven both by media and 
politicians, as it was based on an actual rate of violent 
crime.35 Indeed, the public’s perceptions that juvenile 
crime was on the rise continued even as the juvenile 
crime rate declined.36 Although the dire predictions 
about teenage “super-predators” were never realized, 
between 1992 and 1997 47 states and the District of 
Columbia made their juvenile justice systems more 
punitive.37 As states shifted their laws to make juve-
niles more accountable in order to decrease crime, the 
very juveniles aﬀ ected by the laws were responsible for 
a substantial shift downward in the crime rate, due 
to forces largely unrelated to any legislative initiative. 
Th eories abound about the cause of the downward de-
cline of juvenile crime in the mid-1990s and include 
a more robust job market, the growth of community 
policing, market and policy changes dealing with 
illegal drugs and ﬁ rearms, and even the legalization 
of abortion 20 years earlier.38 Th e cause and eﬀ ect of 
the more punitive laws do not appear to be a lead-
ing factor in the decline, as the shift in the law came 
after the crime rate had already stabilized and begun a 
downward trend.
Moreover, in New Hampshire, the law lower-
ing the age for juveniles was essentially duplicative. 
Violent juvenile oﬀ enders could already be treated as 
adults if they were so certiﬁ ed by a court.39 Certiﬁ ca-
tion required a prosecutor to demonstrate through 
a multifactor test that the oﬀ ender warranted adult 
treatment.40
The Evidence That Juveniles Were Coming into                   
NH to Sell Drugs
Proponents of the new law took the position that 
juveniles from Massachusetts were coming over the 
border to sell drugs, safe in the knowledge that they 
could only be tried as a juvenile if they were caught. 
Statistics provided to the House Committee showed 
that indeed there had been an increase in arrests of ju-
veniles selling drugs between 1990 and 1995.41 Th ese 
statistics showed that in 1993 and 1994, over half of 
the juveniles arrested for drug sales in New Hamp-
shire were from outside the state. Th ese youths were 
Figure 330
Figure 4: National Arrests For 
Youth Violent Crime 1989-1995
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primarily from Lawrence, Massachusetts, an indus-
trial city just south of the New Hampshire border.42 
However, the increase in drug arrests occurred in 
Massachusetts as well, and in Lawrence in particular.43 
Lawrence was one of two New England distribution 
points for the heroin trade in the 1990s, and the city 
saw a signiﬁ cant increase in drug usage between 1993 
and 1999.44 Th e increase in arrests of out-of-state 
juveniles in 1993 and 1994 was quite possibly due to 
the surge in heroin usage just below the border and 
did not necessarily have anything to do with the age at 
which a juvenile could be arrested in New Hampshire.
Th us, the data about juvenile crime did not sup-
port the particular change that ultimately passed 
the New Hampshire legislature. What resulted were 
reforms in a system that was not necessarily “broken.” 
Th e reforms have nevertheless endured, and there are 
indications that they have created more problems than 
they have ﬁ xed.
Justin B
Justin B.45 is a tall, dark-haired, well-spoken 21-
year-old. He is well put together, clean-shaven, neatly 
dressed, and healthy. Th e only mark of his repeated in-
carcerations were two missing teeth lost in a ﬁ ght. He 
spoke clearly and thoughtfully about his past. Justin 
went to jail for the ﬁ rst time when he was seventeen. 
He was charged with underage drinking, and because 
of a change in New Hampshire’s law that lowered 
the age of delinquency from 18 to 17,46 Justin was 
charged as an adult. Ironically, Justin was too young 
to drink alcohol legally, but old enough to handle an 
adult correctional facility. Th is was Justin’s ﬁ rst time 
in the criminal justice system. When he went in front 
of the judge to have his bail set, Justin was released on 
the condition that he “obey his parents.” 
Justin’s path into the “no-man’s land” between the 
juvenile and the adult system started with just the 
sort of “stupid mistake”—underage drinking—that 
proponents of the bill had said would not be covered 
by the bill.
  Justin grew up in a trailer park with his broth-
er, sister, mother, and father. He describes himself as 
a quiet child, “a mother’s boy” who got into trouble 
for small things like not cleaning his room. He had 
a diﬃ  cult relationship with his father, who had little 
tolerance for any misbehavior, and would punish 
Justin by making him stand in a corner facing the wall 
for 12 hours at a time. Justin describes his relation-
ship with his mother as close, and she apparently often 
protected Justin from his father’s anger.
 His two siblings were popular, while Justin was 
more of a loner. In his early teens, Justin’s aunt and 
uncle died, and Justin’s mother took in their young 
children. Over the next few years, Justin’s home life 
unraveled. His mother began using drugs and went to 
rehab. His father kicked Justin out of the house, and 
he went to stay with relatives. 
At age 16, Justin discovered alcohol and remem-
bers that he “loved it.” Th e feeling he got when he 
drank allowed him to “be someone he couldn’t be 
before.” When he was drinking, he felt socially con-
nected. At 17, Justin left his aunt and uncle and 
moved back home. Eventually he and his father began 
to argue again, and he was again asked to leave. With 
nowhere to live—he was too young to go to a shelter 
but too old to be treated as a juvenile—Justin started 
living in his car. It was there that his sister spotted him 
drinking one night and called the police. Th e police 
arrested Justin for underage drinking. At his bail hear-
ing, the judge allowed him to be free but required that 
he live with his parents and “obey them.” 
What Happened in New Hampshire after the Bill 
Passed
Th e lower age at which a child could be treated as 
an adult came into eﬀ ect in January 1996. Th e claim 
that the law would somehow curb violent crime com-
mitted by 17-year-olds has not turned out to be the 
case. As Figure 5 demonstrates, there was no signiﬁ -
cant change in the number of violent crime arrests 
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mit violent crime at roughly the same rate, the only 
diﬀ erence being that they were now treated as adults 
instead of juveniles. In fact, between 1996 and 2005, 
there has been a steady climb in the number of violent 
crime arrests of 17-year-olds (Figure 5).47
Even more signiﬁ cant are the large number of 
arrests for non-violent crimes, in particular alcohol-
related arrests.48 All of these lesser oﬀ enders have 
been processed through the adult court, where their 
access to treatment, school support, and counseling 
programs is limited if not non-existent. In juvenile 
court, judges have the ability to bring in social work-
ers, school representatives, and even parents. Th us, the 
overall upshot of lowering the age to 17 has been that 
many youths who have committed “stupid mistakes,” 
such as underage drinking, end up in the stigmatizing 
and more punitive adult system—a system where they 
lose their privacy and quite probably access to treat-
ment that would divert them out of the system at an 
early age.
In 2002, the NH legislature took up a proposal to 
raise the age back to 18.49 Legislators acknowledged 
that the original goals of the bill had not been accom-
plished and that the claims supporting the bill had 
been overblown or exaggerated.50 Lowering the age to 
17 had, it turned out, many unintended or collateral 
negative consequences. For example, incarcerated 
17-year-olds in need of medical care had to get their 
parents’ permission to receive treatment. Seventeen-
year-olds discharged from a juvenile facility without 
a place to live ended up homeless, and shelters could 
not legally take them in. Th ey were unable to obtain 
food stamps, sign leases, or go on welfare. 51 Recent 
developments in science and brain imaging strongly 
suggest that the adolescent brain’s inability to make 
adult-like decisions presents mitigating factors that 
should impact policy on consequences and punish-
ment for crimes.52
In addition to the many other negative conse-
quences of the bill, it is likely that, as Figure 5 above 
shows, lowering the age to 17 caused more crime then 
it deterred. Although there are no speciﬁ c studies in 
New Hampshire, there have been numerous studies in 
other jurisdictions.53 Th e overall conclusion of these 
studies is that processing juveniles in the adult system 
increases rates of violence among the young oﬀ end-
ers.54 Moreover, the type or length of sentence does 
not seem to make a diﬀ erence; the fact that juveniles 
are processed in adult versus juvenile court increases 
the likelihood of reoﬀ ending.55 Explanations for this 
are numerous. Th e prevailing view is that punitive 
consequences instead of rehabilitative treatment end 
up inﬂ uencing youthful oﬀ enders to commit more, 
rather then less, crime. In the midst of their “forma-
tive” years, these adolescents are easily swayed by their 
environment. 56 
In general, all of the studies done to date indicate 
that transferring a juvenile to adult court increases 
the chances of recidivism.57 Th is is true even when 
juveniles are not incarcerated, but go on probation.58 
Moreover, in at least one study, the recidivism rate 
for juveniles who commit violent crimes is high—24 
percent of transferred juveniles, compared with 16 
percent of retained juveniles.59
Youths who exhibit delinquent behavior likely have 
social deﬁ ciencies and lack healthy human bonds and 
structure in their environment. Putting 17-year-olds 
through the adult process ultimately exposes malleable 
and easily inﬂ uenced young people to more powerful, 
often seductive forces. Youths in adult versus juve-
nile facilities are left to their own devices where they 
congregate with other inmates as opposed to a juvenile 
facility where staﬀ  is more involved with residents.60 
Th is was certainly the experience Justin had.
  Justin
Justin went to jail for the ﬁ rst time when he was 
17. After his initial arrest for alcohol possession, 
Justin returned home. He had a few more run-ins 
with police over alcohol possession. He was arrested 
for possession of marijuana at school. Initially, he 
received a summons for the possession, but when his 
parents found out about the charge, they fought, and 
ultimately had Justin’s bail revoked. Still only 17, he 
stayed in a county correctional jail for three months. 
Th e place was loud and scary, he recalls. As soon as 
he fell asleep, other inmates threw wet toilet paper at 
him. Although the correctional oﬃ  cers ignored him, 
an older inmate, who said that Justin reminded him 
of his own son, took Justin under his wing and from 
then on, the other inmates left him alone. He was of-
fered no treatment and no education. He remembers 
that it was during this time that he ﬁ rst felt depressed. 
He had been lonely before, but never depressed.
After his release, Justin went back to live with his 
parents. He took two full-time jobs and tried to “do 
the right thing,” at least for two months. Before long, 
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he started to argue with his parents again, and they 
called his probation oﬃ  cer. More rules were instituted, 
but eventually, his parents kicked him out, his proba-
tion oﬃ  cer violated him, and he returned to jail. Justin 
recalls that this time he felt more comfortable in jail. 
He was released the day before his 18th birthday, so he 
was able to go into a homeless shelter this time. He 
worked at night and went to school during the day. 
Th is time, Justin’s undoing started when he con-
nected with some friends he had made while in jail. 
Th ey were a little older than he and into drinking. It 
was an incident with “friends” from jail that led to Jus-
tin’s broken front tooth. At 18, some of these “friends” 
jumped Justin, robbed him, tied him up, and locked 
him in the trunk of a car. He was able to escape be-
cause the car was equipped with a child safety lock.
For the next couple of years, Justin went in and out 
of jail. He went into an alcohol treatment program, but 
he did not take the treatment “seriously.” He started 
using heroin before his 20th birthday, and at that point 
he “stopped caring.” Drinking and doing heroin helped 
him cope with feeling alone. His friends from jail, for 
the most part, provided his only social connection.
 By his 21st birthday, Justin had been arrested more 
than 40 times and convicted at least 10 times. All of 
the oﬀ enses were related to his drinking—just the 
kinds of “stupid mistakes” that the original propo-
nents of the bill promised it would not cover. Justin 
spent his 21st birthday in jail. At the very least, he said, 
when he got out he would no longer be arrested for 
underage drinking.
  The Economics
Transferring juveniles to the adult system shifts 
ﬁ nancial responsibility. Whether it is more or less 
expensive to treat 17-year-olds as adults is a subject of 
debate. On the one hand, rehabilitative and com-
munity services for adolescents can be very costly. 
Treating 18-year-olds as adults is costly if they are 
in jail, but if they are not in jail, the overall costs go 
down because the probation services oﬀ ered are not 
as extensive as they would be if rehabilitative services 
were oﬀ ered. However, the long-term costs of treat-
ing juveniles as adults can end up costing much more 
because of all the residual eﬀ ects of failing to provide 
services and support during a formative period of a 
child’s development, incarceration and the overall 
stigma take an emotional toll on a youth.61 Because 
juvenile cases are more carefully managed and individ-
ualized they are more expensive, but it is those same 
reasons that likely lead to fewer juveniles coming back 
into the system.
In New Hampshire, proponents of raising the 
age when a juvenile goes into the adult system back 
to 18 have tried and failed to get a bill passed almost 
yearly since 1995. In 2006, the legislative committee 
considering the change heard testimony that the state 
juvenile detention facility was under capacity, but that 
because of ﬁ xed costs, the facility was essentially losing 
money. 62 States such as New York and Wisconsin are 
considering raising the age back based largely on the 
increased costs (both ﬁ scal and societal); Connecticut 
recently passed legislation raising the age back to 18.63 
Treating juveniles more punitively was, essentially, 
an over-reaction led by politicians and lawmakers who 
were pandering to voters’ media-driven fears about 
juvenile crime. Th e passage of time and a closer look at 
the real data demonstrate that the fears were not justi-
ﬁ ed, and that juvenile crime was not surging. Public 
opinion on the issue has shifted and now leans towards 
treating juveniles as juveniles.64 Indeed, according to 
one poll, public opinion supports the notion of rehabil-
itation and treatment of juveniles as a means to save tax 
dollars.65 Similarly, the public seems to recognize that 
incarcerating youths leads to more, not less, crime.66
Justin’s story is a powerful illustration of the failure 
of the law—as powerful as the anecdotes used by 
the proponents to get the bill passed. More powerful 
perhaps because unlike the few violent crimes that 
led legislators to change the law, the stories of youths 
like Justin are numerous. One need only look at the 
number of youths charged as an adult with crimes like 
alcohol possession (Figure 5) to get a sense of how 
many were aﬀ ected by the law.
Justin Today—at 21
After being released from the county correctional 
facility, Justin is homeless. He is staying at a homeless 
shelter, eating at a soup kitchen, and looking for work. 
Without a cell phone or an address, giving prospective 
employers contact information is impossible. He goes 
to AA meetings and tries to stay away from the people 
he knows will get him back into drugs and alcohol. 
He has no real job skills and a very meager support 
system. Nevertheless, he is optimistic. He feels as 
though he can do it this time. He wants to go to col-
lege (he got his GED in jail) and become a drug and 
alcohol counselor. ?  
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Professor Amy Vorenberg teaches legal skills and 
criminal law at Franklin Pierce Law School in Concord, 
New Hampshire. Before becoming a professor, she was a 
prosecutor in New York City and in New Hampshire. In 
1993, she left prosecution and started the Criminal Prac-
tice Clinic at Franklin Pierce. Th e clinic provides legal 
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